Skip to content

Measurements

IPsec over IPv6 on the XGS 136's engine, outside and inside. Measured, 2026-10-20

Yes, both. A tunnel whose two ends are IPv6 addresses, and IPv6 packets inside it, are taken by the XGS 136's crypto engine in both directions: through the lab tunnel to the second XGS 3300, 951 to 982 Mbit/s with IPv4 inside and 962 to 979 with IPv6 inside, each way, at the gigabit link's rate; with AES-GCM and with AES-CBC and an HMAC; every frame decrypted on the engine and handed up, none refused.

Six IPsec tunnels at once through the XGS 136, 2026-10-20

The XGS 136's side of the sixteen tunnels between the two XGS 3300s: a lab connection of its own on the 136 and the second XGS 3300 with six children, each child one TCP port of the 3300's Port8 address, so each child a tunnel with its own pair of associations; six iperf3 streams from the PC's adapter on F1 at once, for 30 seconds, one to each port - encrypted by the 136's engine and decrypted by the 3300's.

Power over Ethernet switched from XGS: Ports on the XGS 136. Measured, 2026-10-20

The XGS 136's two PoE ports, labels 11 and 12, were read by hand on the coprocessor until now. The Ports page now reads them each time it opens and switches a port's power off, on, or off and on again; a port switched off stays off across a reboot. Measured on the XGS 136 with nothing plugged into either port, so what changed is what the PoE controller reports, not a device's power.

A tunnel brought up over a connection in the XGS 136's hardware. Measured, 2026-10-20

Until this, a connection the XGS 136 had put in hardware stayed there when an IPsec policy came to cover it, and its frames went on leaving the appliance unencrypted (issue 575). Now the flow maker asks the kernel's policy database, as the XGS 3300's driver has since its tunnel flows: a connection a policy covers is never made into a flow, and one already in hardware is taken out the moment a policy comes to cover it. Measured both ways, on the build before and the build after.

A reload of the module puts OPNsense's interfaces back, XGS 136, 2026-10-20

A reload of npuep.ko destroys every front port's interface and makes it again, and OPNsense is not told. Until today the XGS 136 came back from one with its LAN bridge empty and without its address, and the WAN on Port1 without its own - reachable over its console only, until three configctl calls by hand. contrib/npuep/reload.sh now does what a boot does once the ports are back:

The XGS 136's receive rings on the coprocessor's doorbells, 2026-10-20

Until today the XGS 136's host emptied its receive rings on a clock: every millisecond since 2026-10-17, and only then. The coprocessor has four target-to-host doorbells for the GIU - MSI-X vectors the driver allocated and counted - and they never rang, because every receive queue was added with msix_id 0. The vendor's own host driver runs its receive on them by default (msix_mode 1, "Rx"), giving queue q the facility's doorbell q, whose id is that vector's place in the order the vectors are allocated in.

The Traffic Shaper and a connection in hardware, measured, 2026-10-20

OPNsense's Traffic Shaper and its Captive Portal decide in ipfw, and ipfw sees a packet only while the host forwards it. A connection the coprocessor forwards itself never reaches it: it escapes a shaper's pipe, and a portal's client that logs out keeps what it had open. Nothing in this project knew that until today. Measured on the second XGS 3300, and fixed: whatever an enabled shaper rule or portal zone names is now kept with the host, as if the owner had put it on the never-offloaded list.

Tunnel connections in the XGS 136's flow table. Measured, 2026-10-20

A connection that runs through an IPsec tunnel now leaves the XGS 136's host for its direction that leaves encrypted: the fast path forwards it and encrypts it on the engine itself, as it forwards a plain connection. Through the lab tunnel, one stream held 916 Mbit/s either way; with the setting on, the host handed the engine no frame of it to encrypt where it had handed it some 333,000 every four seconds, the host's CPUs went from 23 % to 11 % busy, and not one frame of it reached the far end in the clear. A rekey in the middle took the connection out of the table before its association went, the host carried it for a few seconds, and the flow maker made it again with the new one.

Unusual traffic, reported, measured, 2026-10-19

XGS: Settings - Watch for unusual traffic. Off until it is turned on, and it never blocks: it says, in the XGS log, what no normal day looks like. Every minute scripts/xgs/anomaly.py (cron) reads pf's state table every ten seconds through a window of fifty, keeps every connection any reading saw, and for each host that opened connections works out what it did in the window - bytes sent and received, connections opened, new addresses reached, and the most ports it tried on any one address. Then:

Does the coprocessor drop an address it is given? Measured, 2026-10-19

No - not on the XGS 3300's firmware (v22), and not on the XGS 136's either (measured 2026-10-20). The question came from the vendor's own design: its command list has three commands between the QoS ones and the first IPsec one - DOS_SET_POLICY, DOS_ADD_BLACKLIST_ENTRY and DOS_CLEAR_BLACKLIST, 27, 28 and 29 - with their structures in dos_table.h: a policy (a packets-per-second ceiling, a type, whether a source over the ceiling is blacklisted, and for how long) and an entry (a family, a type, an address, a duration). The XGS 136's helper module was built with two more facts about them - an even type is a source and the next odd one its destination; an entry lasts 30 seconds by default and 3,600 at most - and with an error code for a full DoS table. If the coprocessor kept such a table, a block list could be enforced there, at the port, before a frame reached the host.